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This Was the One for Me
AfD Women’s Origin Stories

Christina Xydias

Political Science, Bucknell University

Abstract: Next to the Alternative for Germany (AfD)’s nationalism and antiimmigrant attitudes, natalism and support for traditional gender roles are key
components of the party’s far right categorization. Women are not absent from
parties like the AfD, though they support them at lower rates than men and
at lower rates than they support other parties. In light of women’s lower presence in far-right parties, how do women officeholders in the AfD explain their
party affiliation, and how do their explanations differ from men’s? An answer
is discernible at the nexus between AfD officeholders’ publicly available political backgrounds and the accounts that they offer for joining the party, termed
“origin stories.” Empirically, this article uses an original dataset of political biographical details for all the AfD’s state and federal legislators elected between
2013 and late 2019. This dataset shows that AfD women at the state level are less
likely than their men counterparts to have been affiliated with a political party,
and they are less likely to have been politically active, prior to their participation
in the AfD. Regardless of the facts of their backgrounds, however, women more
than men explain their support of the AfD as a choice to enter into politics, and
men more than women explain their support of the AfD as a choice to leave
another party. The article argues that these gendered origin stories can be contextualized within the party’s masculinist, natalist, and nationalist values.
Keywords: Alternative for Germany (AfD), career paths, gender performance,
presentation of self, women

Introduction

We are closer to achieving gender equality in today’s world than ever

before.1 In this context, new political parties on the right and far right are finding voters and willing office seekers among women in spite of policy agendas
that are unambiguously opposed to women’s equality. Many parties on the far
right do not merely espouse different routes to gender equality, perhaps (as
a libertarian party would) opposing state intervention to achieve it. Instead,
they actively promote patriarchal messages and policies on women’s rights.2
Feminism itself is of course not monolithic in Germany or elsewhere, and
not all people received as women view themselves as feminist or support
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feminism.3 Conventional wisdom, however, views political parties on the
right, and in particular on the far right, as unlikely sites for advancing the
rights and interests of women as a group. In terms of women’s political preferences, women in western democracies are in the aggregate more supportive of policies and parties associated with the left.4 In terms of parties’ policy
agendas, parties associated with the right pay less attention than their left
counterparts to issues that public opinion polling indicates women care more
about.5 Further, the agendas that parties on the right (and in particular the
far right) promote that do relate to these issues, such as family policy that
promotes at-home child care rather than develop public infrastructure for
child care, are more likely to reinforce than to challenge traditional gender
roles.6 Worldwide, more women are elected into political office from parties on the left.7 This latter statistic is especially significant, because research
on women’s descriptive and substantive representation indicates that parties
with fewer women officeholders are also parties less engaged in promoting
women’s rights and interests.8
In light of this characterization of far right parties, how do women officeholders in Germany’s Alternative for Germany (Alternative für Deutschland,
AfD) explain their party affiliation, and how do their explanations differ from
men’s? An answer to these questions is discernible at the nexus between their
publicly available political backgrounds and the accounts that they offer for
joining the party, accounts that this article terms “origin stories.” Gendered
origin stories—explanations for joining the AfD that broadly differ between
women and men—can be contextualized within the masculinist, natalist, and
nationalist values of the party. An officeholder’s origin story is especially
informative when it diverges from the facts of their political background in
order to make the story accord with these values.
In order to investigate gendered justifications that AfD officeholders offer
for their party affiliation, this article draws from an original dataset of the
364 AfD officeholders (forty-nine women and 315 men) elected into state
and federal legislatures since the parties’ establishment in 2013. Its empirical findings address these questions in two ways. First, publicly available
information about AfD officeholders’ political backgrounds evince gendered
patterns. At the state level, women are less likely than their men counterparts to have been affiliated with a political party, and they are less likely to
have been politically active prior to their participation in the AfD. Second,
an examination of public statements by AfD officeholders offers the opportunity to map this finding onto officeholders’ origin stories. Women more
than men explain their support of the AfD as a choice to enter into politics;
men more than women explain their support of the AfD as a choice to leave
•••
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another party. These origin stories function as gendered explanations for
AfD support, separate from officeholders’ factual backgrounds.
The article proceeds as follows. First, it establishes the AfD as a masculinist, natalist, and nationalist political party. Second, it reviews the literature on
political officeholders’ career trajectories, highlighting that within-party variation is noteworthy. Third, it justifies closer attention to what the article terms
officeholders’ “origin stories,” i.e., their explanations for running for office
with the AfD. In subsequent empirical sections, it presents findings from an
original dataset of AfD officeholders’ political backgrounds and origin stories.

Women, Gender, and the AfD
As a formal political organization, the AfD’s initial election program in 2013
was a small document that focused on opposition to the Euro.9 The party’s
evolution in the period leading up to the 2017 federal elections is clear in the
rhetoric of party leadership, specific features of campaigns, and the text of the
party manifesto. Through these messages, the AfD’s agenda extended into a
wider spectrum of issues that invite the characterization of far right populist.10
Even the 2014 European Parliament manifesto referred to the sexes’ “different identities, social roles and life situations.” By 2017, Thomas Klikauer
goes so far as to assert that “the AfD might indeed by called Germany’s new
Nazis,” on the basis of party leaders’ unabashed invocation of long-taboo
nativist symbols and terminology, such as the word völkisch.11
Journalists and political scientists now consistently locate the AfD on the
far right, where scholars argue that political parties are often constitutively
opposed to the idea of social equality (see Barbara Donovan, this issue). This
opposition takes form in two more specific ideological orientations: social
traditionalism and hegemonic ethnic supremacy. On the right, advocacy for
traditional social roles corresponds with support of policies that reinforce
these roles (such as an insistence on child care in the home). On the far
right, social traditionalism corresponds (to varying degrees of explicitness)
with natalist policies that focus on women as reproducers of national identity.12 Umut Erel’s study of right-wing politics and gender in the uk notes that
political parties in this ideological category value stereotypically feminized
labor in the sense that the “work of social and cultural reproduction of the
nation is undertaken by women, be it in the realm of the family or through
educational institutions.”13
Parties that are considered far right are further distinguished by elements
of hegemonic-ethnic supremacy. Norberto Bobbio, Anne McClintock, and
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Cas Mudde contend that far-right parties share a fundamental belief in natural inequalities, within families (men superior to women) and within societies (one ethnic group superior to others).14 Social equality—between genders
as between ethnic communities—is not merely viewed as low priority; it is
viewed as unnatural.
In short, far right parties are not generally expected to want to mobilize
women supporters, for a variety of reasons. They may not expect to be able
to do so, given women’s aggregate preference for the left. And they may not
view mobilization of women as central to the party’s ideological goals, in
particular if those goals include preserving traditional gender hierarchies in
which women play a lesser role in public life. Finally, they may view mobilizing women into formal political activity as outright contrary to natalist goals.
“The right,” like “the left,” is a heterogeneous category, and it is ideologically possible in some settings for a party to defy general expectations
about its likelihood of engaging in advocacy for women’s rights and interests.
Nevertheless, the AfD is not an exception to these expectations. Although
its origins were arguably relatively centrist and focused on opposition to the
Europeanization of Germany’s economy, documents and public statements
produced by key party figures simultaneously established it as a political
movement opposed to social equality from its inception. Kai Arzheimer and
Carl Berning and others trace the party’s shift towards the radical right over
the course of the 2013–2017 period,15 but, ideologically, thinkers propounding natural inequalities wrote some of the party’s founding documents. Marc
Jongen, AfD member of the Bundestag since the 2017 elections, is a philosopher by training. His 22 January 2014 manifesto for the AfD asserts that
policies of equal treatment are contrary to liberal democracy.16 In other writings, Jongen defends the importance of “thymos,” one of Plato’s three parts
of the psyche. Robert Kagan defines thymos as “a spiritedness and ferocity in
defense of clan, tribe, city, or state,” arguing that a global rise in thymos motivates foreign policies that aim for “honor and glory.”17 Thymos has stereotypically masculine associations.
Philosophically, the idea that Germany requires protection against being
overrun by the European Union and by culturally different groups—points
central to the AfD’s agenda—is a thymotic project. This project extends to
preserving traditional German familial culture. In this spirit, AfD documents and public statements by its officeholders assert opposition to what
they term Gender-Wahn, i.e., “gender madness,” a negative term for efforts to
alter traditional social arrangements through such policies as legally allowing a third gender and promoting paternal leave. For example, Thomas
Prantl (AfD member of Saxony’s state legislature) voices this position in
•••
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his assertion that “gender ideology is an attack on the time-proven family model of husband, wife, and children, which is the way of life for most
people in Saxony.”18
On the basis of this information, we can sum up the AfD’s gender values
as masculinist, natalist, and nationalist. Further, women’s presence in office
with the AfD is disproportionately low compared to the rest of the German
party system. As of February 2020, women comprise approximately 13 percent of AfD state and federal legislators. In the Bundestag, women’s presence
in the AfD is even lower, at 11 percent of the party’s seats. The party group
in the Bundestag with the second lowest presence of women is the Christian
Democratic Union/Christian Social Union (cdu/csu), at 20.7 percent of the
group’s seats. In turn, women occupy more than 50 percent of the seats held
by two party groups in the Bundestag (the Left: 53.6 percent, and the Greens:
58.2 percent).19 As of November 2019 at the state level, all but two (of sixteen) state legislatures included at least 25 percent women, even including
the AfD’s seats.20
How do women explain their presence in this setting, and how do their
explanations differ from men’s?

Research on Officeholders’ Backgrounds
This section discusses research on public officeholders’ (largely legislators’)
backgrounds, in order to show how this information informs an interpretation of gendered explanations for holding office with the AfD. This literature finds consistently that legislators come from higher-status backgrounds.
Donald Matthews writes, “few generalizations have been more exhaustively
supported by empirical research.”21 Across advanced industrial democracies,
officeholders come from a relatively short list of occupations. Although u.s.
state legislatures and Congress include a disproportionate presence of lawyers, this pattern is replaced with other professional categories in other societies based upon time-use flexibility associated with occupations in different
settings.22 In terms of their political background, people elected into office
have typically been politically engaged, often at more local levels, prior to
their election. People elected into office tend to have served at a lower level
before, i.e., they ascend from more local office.
The size of the party is likely to affect the primacy of previous political experience. Writing about factors that explain the ordering of candidates on Romanian political parties’ closed-list European Union ballots, Sergiu Gherghina and
Mihail Chiru show that personal wealth often explains higher list placement
•••
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across parties, but parties vary in the salience of previous political experience.
In a pooled model, previous national level service makes a candidate 1.5 times
more likely to be placed one spot above the average spot.23 This is not the case
for all political parties, however. In particular, larger parties appear to drive the
pattern of seasoned candidates’ higher list placement, an effect that holds when
controlled for gender.24 For a small newcomer like Germany’s AfD, Gherghina
and Chiru’s findings might suggest a more general party-wide deemphasis on
previous experience. As subsequent empirical sections show, women in the
AfD appear to be different from their men counterparts.
Other findings emphasize correlates of varied political experience. Susan
Scarrow’s study of Members of the European Parliament (meps) examines
variation in meps’ tenure in office, distinguishing between “long-termers”
(i.e., ep careerists) and “short-termers.”25 She argues that the ep’s increasing empowerment relative to the national legislatures of member states is
happening in concert with meps’ longer-term commitments to the legislative
body. This analysis of meps’ career paths finds that meps either have held no
previous elected office, or have substantial, serious (such as national legislative service) previous experience.26 Career meps show signs of being most
invested in the ep as an institution.
Scarrow’s findings have several implications for the AfD. AfD officeholders at the state level who have a record of extensive prior political
activity may be using the party as a stepping-stone to other or different
office. These are more seasoned politicians. Regardless of the level of
office (state vs. federal), AfD officeholders who are “short-termers” or otherwise newcomers may have different career trajectories ahead of them. A
gendered difference between seasoned officeholders and shorter-termers
therefore suggests different career trajectories for women compared to
men, and the literature suggests these correspond with different vote- and
policy-seeking goals.
In another study of the European Parliament, Christina Xydias finds that
cross-national variation in meps’ age distribution correlates with women’s
rates of election into the ep.27 Greater interest in ep service—which the study
measures as meps’ ages, with older ages signaling that the ep is more desirable—reduces the translation of the pool of women eligibles into meps. In
other words, some member states send older, longer-time politicians to the
ep than others; these countries do not elect as many women as we would
expect from other national-level indicators of women’s engagement in politics (women’s presence in the national legislature, and their labor force participation). Extrapolating to this study of the AfD, we might expect that the
very small supply of women who aspire to run for office as AfD members
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and then do so may indeed be quite different in their backgrounds from their
men counterparts.
A related research program examines whether legislators’ career features
correlate with their behavior in office. For example, Stephen Meserve et al.
use meps’ ages as a proxy for where they are in their career, and they find that
earlier career politicians are more likely to break from leadership and vote
against their parties.28 They interpret this behavior as a signal to domestic,
rather than European, political ambitions. Those authors’ findings may rely
upon stable party positions from which a legislator could diverge, i.e., if legislators in the AfD exhibit low policy cohesiveness, this may simply be that
the party is new with a relatively uncrystallized agenda, not that legislators
vary in their career ambitions.
Demographic studies of German politicians indicate that many of these
global findings hold for Germany, as well. Melanie Kintz’s analysis of the 2013
federal elections—in which a large proportion of federal legislators retired and
the Free Democratic Party (fdp) lost all of their seats in the Bundestag—shows
persistent patterns.29 Members of the Bundestag are typically better educated
than the general population; Kintz’s data show that 82.5 percent of legislators
elected in 2013 have a college degree. In the German system, politicians disproportionately rise into federal office from a career in the civil service. Although
this remains the case, Kintz identifies a growing trend in Germany of Bundestag members having worked as professionals with political organizations,
such as political party infrastructure, unions, etc. These findings underscore
yet further how unexpected it is to identify a cohort of officeholders who are
not only under-professionalized, they are under-professionalized compared to
other members of their own political party.
The literature on officeholders’ backgrounds agrees that these patterns
generally persist across gender. The principal gendered pattern in trajectories
to political office is obviously that women hold office at lower, and in some
settings considerably lower, rates than men counterparts. Among officeholders, some studies discern minor gendered patterns within these trajectories to
political office but in the main, legislators are overwhelmingly professionals
with a record of political activity.
In sum, extensive research shows that officeholders’ backgrounds are
meaningful. Cross-party variation in backgrounds offers information about
how political parties’ gatekeeping practices and preferences differ. Crossnational variation among officeholders within a regional decision making
body such as the ep suggests divergent perceptions of the significance of the
office or legislative body. Finally, within-party variation in backgrounds is
outright unusual.
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Origin Stories
Alongside biographical facts that are often part of their public record, candidates and officeholders promote accounts of their political backgrounds.
They do so through media such as personal websites, public speeches, and
published interviews with journalists. Here, officeholders’ accounts of how
they joined the AfD are termed origin stories. This section briefly justifies
taking origin stories seriously.
A body of sociological theory dating to Erving Goffman argues that individuals create and recreate their identity in how they choose to appear and
behave to others, i.e., through their “presentation of self.”30 This theory finds
ready application in political science. In his study of political representation in the u.s. Congress, for instance, Richard Fenno describes how House
members “cultivate their constituencies.”31 Central to cultivating constituencies are legislators’ presentation of self and how they explain their legislative
activities to their district. Legislators choose which issues to highlight, and
how to draw their constituents’ attention to their priorities.32
More specifically, gender may be understood as a performance. Judith
Butler, Goffman, Candace West and Don Zimmerman, and others argue that
individuals perform or “do” gender, reaffirming social constructs of gender
through their interactions with one another.33 This approach emphasizes that
individuals’ presentation of gender, and how they prioritize signals through
which they communicate with others, is more important than a “fact” of sex
or gender. Sheri Kunovich and Amanda Wall, for example, examine u.s.
Congressional websites for gendered variation in presentation of self.34 They
argue that online autobiographies “contain both personal and professional
details that the politicians believe the public wants to know,” making them
“important documents through which we can examine how female politicians strategically do or do not use gender to appeal to voters.”35
In the context of a masculinist, natalist, and nationalist setting like the
AfD, both women and men officeholders may do gender by promoting stereotypically gendered origin stories, i.e., origin stories that conform with the
gender values of their political party.

Data and Methods
This article’s dataset covers all legislators at the state and federal level elected
into office as members of the AfD through late 2019. Thus it includes individuals in seats won in state legislative elections that have taken place between the
•••
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party’s establishment in 2013 and the end of 2019, as well as individuals who
won their seats in the Bundestag’s 2017 election. Germany’s state legislatures
hold elections every four to five years, and their timing is staggered, meaning
that the AfD has had opportunities to win seats in “new” settings as time has
passed. The dataset’s unit of analysis is the individual officeholder, i.e., the small
number of AfD officeholders who have won multiple seats are in the dataset just
once, for their office at the time that data collection concluded (February 2020).
The AfD also won seven seats in the European Parliament’s 2014 elections
and eleven in 2019, but these individuals are not included in this dataset
unless they have separately occupied state or federal legislative office. For
example, Beatrix von Storch served in the European Parliament 2014–2017,
leaving in order to enter the Bundestag in 2017. She is in this dataset as a
member of the Bundestag.
Data were drawn from these officeholders’ online biographies, published
on their respective legislatures’ websites (e.g., www.bundestag.de); from their
German-language Wikipedia entry; and from at least two Google-search
pages, including news coverage. The resulting dataset includes basic biographical information (birthdate and gender), whether these sources show
evidence of a record of party affiliation (prior to the AfD) and political officeholding (prior to their current office), and what those prior parties and offices
were, when applicable. A separate variable indicates whether the officeholder
has explicitly disavowed prior party affiliation, in order to highlight when
individuals do so in spite of publicly available information to the contrary.
Finally, news coverage of these officeholders occasionally includes public
statements regarding their support of, and campaigning with, the AfD. These
accounts constitute origin stories. Origin stories gleaned from news coverage
are then supplemented with qualitative material from a limited number of
personal interviews with AfD women legislators conducted by the author in
May 2017. Even while it does not establish frequency in a statistical sense, a
qualitative analysis of visible origin stories points towards gendered strategies
for “presentation of self.” Paired with publicly available facts, these origin
stories inform a characterization of how women and men explain their selection of the AfD.
Several caveats regarding internet data collection are needed. Data collection was undertaken via web searches in two waves: August 2018 and
February 2020. Although information provided by official online biographies (birthdate; gender; prior party affiliation and officeholding) is unlikely
to have changed in this timeframe, the publication and availability of news
coverage are time-dependent. Therefore, again, visible origin stories are suggestive rather than conclusive.
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AfD Officeholders
Overview
By the end of 2019, the AfD held seats in all sixteen states, as well as in the
Bundestag. Tables 1 and 2 show that women comprise 14.0 percent of AfD
state-level legislators, and 12 percent of the party’s seats in the Bundes
tag,36 the lowest percentages of any major party in contemporary Germany. In this dataset, women and men elected into state legislatures share
an average birthyear of 1967.37 In the Bundestag, AfD women’s average
birthyear of 1970 is statistically significantly different from men’s average
of 1965, but these cohorts are still broadly generationally similar. Women’s
and men’s birthyear ranges are also similar, spanning the early 1940s to
the early 1990s. In terms of their ages, therefore, AfD women and men
have had similar timeframes for developing careers, political or otherwise.
Some research has shown that women across parties in Germany enter
politics later in life, perhaps after a Familienphase.38 This is not the case for
AfD women.
AfD State Legislators
The AfD is new, established in early 2013. The youngest sitting legislator
with the AfD was just 20 years old at that time, but most were in their forties.
It might be reasonable to expect, especially in Germany’s “apprenticeship”
politician model, that elected legislators would have worked with parties
prior to joining the AfD.39 On the other hand, the AfD markets itself as an
alternative to the political establishment. For example, the AfD party group
in the state legislature of Hesse proclaims on its website, “With one exception, none of us were career politicians.”40 However, this holds true differently for women and men.
In this dataset, just five of the thirty-nine AfD women (13.2 percent) in
state-level legislative seats identify prior political party affiliation. All of the
parties that they identify are right-leaning: the cdu, the Deutsche Soziale
Union, the Deutsche Partei, Die Freiheit, the fdp, Freie Wähler, and the
Ökologisch-Demokratischen Partei. One of these women, Gudrun Petzold
(Saxony), reports that she was active with the cdu’s Junge Union from 1970
to 1980. After what appears to be a thirty-three-year gap, Petzold indicates
that she joined the AfD in 2013. In this vein, state-level women officeholders’ biographies suggest a greater likelihood of jumping into political office
shortly after their joining the AfD. Their professional vitae do not include
extensive prior political office, with 26.3 percent of them (ten women)
indicating it.
•••
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By contrast, seventy men (29.9 percent) indicate prior party affiliation,
which is statistically significantly different from their women counterparts.
Further, these prior parties are all over the ideological map. Although rightleaning parties are more heavily represented, the list includes the cdu, Die
Freiheit, fdp, Freie Wähler, Grüne, kpd, Neues Forum, Die Republikaner, the
sed, and the Social Democrats (spd). This constellation of prior parties corresponds with data on voting supporters of the party.41 A low percentage of men
(1.28 percent, just three officeholders) state in their official online biographies
that they were vorher parteilos (previously without party affiliation). In turn,
AfD men at the state level also have statistically significantly higher rates of
prior political officeholding. Of the 234 AfD men in state legislatures, 43.6
percent indicate prior office. These positions include, for example, city and
community councils. This is a considerably higher percentage than the rates
of prior political office among women at the state level, and it is more in line
with the findings of previous research on political careers.
This biographical information points towards gendered differences in
AfD state legislators’ pathways to political office. In the aggregate, it characterizes women’s entry into office with the AfD as their entry into politics,
full stop. Later sections discuss how officeholders’ origin stories may aim to
contextualize these patterns in the political party’s gender values.
AfD Members of the Bundestag
The AfD won ninety-two seats in the Bundestag in Germany’s 2017 federal
elections, ushering it into position as the third largest party group.42 This
represents a significant event in the German party system, including the first
successful bid for Bundestag seats by a party to the right of the cdu/csu since
1957.43 The AfD’s success had the additional effect of contributing to lowering percentage of women’s overall membership in the Bundestag (from 37.1
percent in the preceding legislature to 31 percent), because women won just
eleven of these ninety-two seats.
Table 2 shows that, of the eleven women elected into the Bundestag as
members of the AfD, just one woman (9.1 percent) identifies a previous
party, and one woman (9.1 percent) expressly states that she was vorher parteilos. Beatrix von Storch identifies herself as having been a member of the
fdp from 2011 until 2013, when she joined the AfD. Von Storch’s own story
about the origins of her political activity, however, downplay formal party
membership, as later sections address.
The rate at which AfD men in the Bundestag report prior party affiliation
is higher than their women counterparts, though this difference is not statistically significant: twenty-four men (29.6 percent) indicate a prior party. As
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Table 1: Women and Men AfD Officeholders at the State Level,
Elected 2014–2019
The AfD in State
Legislatures

Women
N=38
Mean		
(Std. Dev.)
Range

Year of birth
Member of a
political party
prior to AfD
  Political officeholder
prior to current role
in the state legislature

Men			
N=234
Mean
(Std. Dev.)

Range

1967
(11.319)

1942/
1993

13.2%		
–
0/1
0.132 (0.343)*		

29.9%
–
0.299 (0.459)*

0/1

26.3%		
–
0/1
0.263 (0.446)**		

43.6%
–
0.436 (0.497)**

0/1

1.28%
–
0.0128 (0.113)

0/1

1967
(11.370)

1945/
1988

Explicitly states 			
no prior party
0
0
affiliation			

* Rate of prior party membership is statistically significantly different between women
and men, p < 0.032 (Fisher’s Exact).
** Rate of prior political officeholding is statistically significantly different between
women and men, p < 0.051 (Fisher’s Exact).

subsequent sections address at greater length, reporting this information is
significant both in terms of factual political background as well as in terms of
how officeholders frame it when offered the opportunity to elaborate. Sometimes the omission of details seems a bit coy. For example, now-AfD member
Martin Hohmann (Hesse) served in the Bundestag 1998–2005 as a member
of the cdu; his current Bundestag biography mentions this prior service but
omits his party affiliation.44 As for explicit rejection of prior party attachment,
AfD men in the Bundestag exhibit a rate that is not statistically significant different from women’s: of eighty men, three (3.7 percent) expressly assert that
they had no prior political affiliation.
Unlike in state legislatures, AfD women and men in the Bundestag do not
appear to differ statistically in their rates of prior officeholding. These rates,
while not statistically significantly different, reverse what we see at the statelevel. In the Bundestag, AfD women appear to have higher rates of prior
officeholding than their men counterparts. These results may be due to the
small sample size of women; alternatively, they may reflect findings from
existing research showing that a higher level of office (federal vs. state) corresponds with more extensive prior officeholding. The possible difference in
•••
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Table 2: Women and Men AfD Officeholders in Bundestag, Elected 2017
The AfD in the
Bundestag

Women
N=11†
Mean		
(Std. Dev.)
Range

Year of birth
Member of a
political party
prior to AfD
  Political officeholder
prior to current role
in the Bundestag
Explicitly states
no prior party
affiliation

Men			
N=81
Mean
(Std. Dev.)

Range

1966
(12.173)††

1940/
1991

9.1%		
–
0/1
0.091 (0.302)		

29.6%
–
0.296 (0.459)

0/1

36.4%		
–
0/1
0.364 (0.505)		

18.5%
–
0.185 (0.391)

0/1

9.1%		
–
0/1
0.091 (0.302)		

3.7%
–
0.0370 (0.190)

0/1

1970
(9.872)††

1945/
1983

†
This includes Frauke Petry and Verena Hartmann, because they were elected into the
Bundestag with the AfD.
††
Women’s birthyear is statistically significantly later than men’s, p < 0.094
(1-tailed t-test).

prior officeholding between women and men may be attributable to gendered
gatekeeping processes in the AfD, but there is insufficient information to know.
AfD Officeholders’ Origin Stories
Goffman and others argue that individuals perform their identity in context, for an audience.45 These presentations-of-self seek to produce a specific
impression. This section offers a qualitative analysis of illustrative AfD officeholders’ origin stories to support the broader claim that women and men
may view their support for this party as requiring different kinds of justifications. Public figures make choices about which details to include or exclude
in their accounts, and they may choose to misrepresent details. Earlier sections of the article argued that the AfD’s gender values consist of masculinism, natalism, and nationalism. Thus, for members of the AfD, origin stories
may be gendered in ways that reflect the gender values of the party, whether
or not these officeholders’ actual political backgrounds conform.
For the AfD woman officeholder, the generic origin story appears to be
that the party wooed her into politics. She was persuaded to run for office
in spite of avowed resistance to formal politics. This is her story, even if
facts indicate otherwise. Regardless of their actual political or professional
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backgrounds, AfD women in office may choose to present traditionally gendered origin stories.
For example, current member of the Bundestag Frauke Petry used to
introduce herself on her website with the following opening words: “… In
2012 when I decided, as a mother of then four children, to become politically
active, I committed to fighting for citizens’ interests …. ”46 In these words,
Petry emphasizes her role as a mother, and she portrays herself as someone who became political. The facts of Petry’s political or professional background prior to the AfD are separate from her assertion that the AfD was the
party for her. Petry herself subsequently left the AfD to form the Blaue Partei,
but she has framed her entry into politics as synonymous with the AfD.
On her personal website, Bavarian state legislator Katrin Ebner-Steiner
explains that she got involved in politics, because she “could no longer
remain inactive.” She continues: “In the AfD,” she feels like she is “at the
right address.”47 Like Petry, Ebner-Steiner portrays her entry into politics and
her support for the AfD in the same breath. Further, she locates her party
affiliation in the home—“at the right address.” Sabine Barthel (Brandenburg
Landtag) asserts that she first joined the AfD in 2016, because she was dissatisfied with politics.48 Combined with an apparent absence of prior party
affiliation, Barthel’s origin story resonates with Petry’s and Ebner-Steiner’s.
Together, these origin stories emphasize the desire to change politics with the
AfD. They do not explain prior parties’ inadequacy.
Petry, Ebner-Steiner, and Barthel’s origin stories depict them in their “first
marriage” in politics, and they resemble the stories of two AfD women interviewed by the author in May 2017. These interviews were in the context of
a broader effort at speaking with women to the right of center in Germany,
and they were conducted in the state legislative buildings of MecklenburgWest Pomerania and Saxony. The women were several decades apart in age,
and they differed considerably in their social traditionalism, but they offered
strikingly similar accounts of becoming political when and because the AfD
was established. The younger interviewee stated that she had been upset
about European bailouts of Greece, and the AfD provided an organization
for becoming involved in politics. When asked about the AfD’s orientation
towards gender and sexual politics, she asserted that families come in many
forms, and that the AfD was not backwards in this area. The older interviewee
similarly described entering into politics because of the AfD’s emergence. She
said that she had attended local AfD meetings in her community, drawn by a
shared opposition to Europeanization. This latter interviewee stated that she
had never wanted to run for office, and she described needing to be persuaded to run. In contrast to the other interviewee, she asserted that children need
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a father and a mother, and she offered several other observations in favor of
traditional family roles. In short, these women expressed divergent opinions
on matters of social politics, but they converged in their origin stories.
Even publicly known past connections to other parties do not preclude origin stories to the contrary. Although von Storch was previously a member of
the fdp, she is quoted in interviews as disavowing formal party affiliation. In an
English-language May 2017 interview, she stated: “I’ve been active in politics
for twenty years without being a member of any party or any parliament … I
thought that the political parties would not take care of the changes we need.
They’re only focused on the next election, not the real problems we have.”49
Von Storch’s disavowal of former political parties is disingenuous, given her
family history: her grandfather served as Adolf Hitler’s finance minister.50 This
inconsistency between von Storch’s biographical facts and the account that
she offers underscores that origin stories provide intentional framing.
The origin stories that are available for AfD men officeholders differ from
those of their women counterparts. Numerous AfD men pointedly express
dissatisfaction with earlier political experiences. Indeed, a key feature of
founding AfD members’ rhetoric was that specific existing political parties
were not serving Germany well. Konrad Adam, Alexander Gauland, and
Bernd Lucke (three men) were all public figures firmly associated with the
cdu prior to promoting the “Wahlalternative 2013.” Newspaper headlines
referred to the trio explicitly as “disappointed cdu politicians.”51
Another gendered metaphor is unambiguous in some AfD men’s origin
stories. Karl Hermann Bolldorf (now in Hesse’s state legislature), a forty-year
cdu member and former mayor, describes his departure from the cdu like
a divorce: “Like in a marriage … At first, you insist that just a few things
bother you.”52 Along the same lines, Jörg Kühne (in Saxony’s Landtag) states
that “he now sees his time in the cdu as a political mistake; this is why he
switched to the AfD in 2014.”53 Similarly, Jan Schiffers (in Bavaria’s Landtag)
states that he “previously supported the cdu and csu but became increasingly dissatisfied with their politics … this new party spoke to [him].”54 To
varying degrees, these origin stories depict prior parties as unsatisfying.
AfD men are in the aggregate more likely to identify a prior party affiliation than women, but not all available origin stories adhere straightforwardly
to the same metaphor. For example, an origin story expressed by Mario
Beger (in Saxony’s Landtag) mirrors Petry’s language (above): “I became
politically active, because I saw the consequences of the introduction of the
Euro in Spain.”55 In turn, Jan-Oliver Zwerg (in Saxony’s Landtag) goes so
far as to frame his entry into politics in family terms. He is quoted as stating
that “as a businessman he would far rather stay at home at the end of the
•••

119 •••

Christina Xydias

workday … but Germany is in danger.”56 Zwerg’s emphasis on Germany
needing protection engages Jongen’s philosophical theme of thymos. Zwerg
does not describe the inadequacy of his first political marriage; instead, he
asserts his responsibility to protect.
Although available origin stories for AfD men vary, none outright contradicts a publicly visible biography, as some women’s origin stories do. One
interpretation of this finding is that AfD women confront distinctive questions about their party affiliation. Women in the AfD may be more likely to
offer a stereotypically gendered (feminized) origin story, and in particular a
story that emphasizes the AfD as the only party for them, because they are
so few in number, and because the party does not champion gender equality.
Further, likely AfD voters may respond more positively to women’s origin
stories when those accounts resonate with more traditional gender values.

Conclusions
This article draws from AfD officeholders’ biographies and from their visible origin stories to generate two sets of claims. First, in the aggregate,
AfD women and men officeholders at the state level have distinctive political backgrounds. Men more than women report prior party affiliation and
have held prior political office. The literature on political career trajectories
shows that within-party variation in background like this is unusual. At the
federal level, by contrast, women and men appear report statistically similar in their rates of prior party affiliation and officeholding. Although it is
not statistically significant, one finding is reversed for AfD members of the
Bundestag compared to the state legislators: women appear to have higher
rates of prior officeholding than their men counterparts. This finding may
be due to low sample size (just eleven AfD women elected to the Bundestag
in 2017), or it could be due to systematic processes. Future research on AfD
political recruitment can shed light on the role of party gatekeepers in producing these effects.
Second, regardless of the facts of their political backgrounds, women
and men appear to offer gendered explanations for their affiliation with the
party. Among AfD women, the performance of self that these origin stories
comprise is especially noteworthy when it diverges from publicly available
details about their backgrounds. In light of conventional assessments of far
right parties’ commitment to promoting women’s rights and interests, how
do AfD women explain their party affiliation? They may do so in terms of
their party’s gender values, which emphasize social traditionalism.
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At the same time, a number of AfD women for whom interest in the AfD
was synonymous with their entry into politics have very publicly moved
onward. Most visibly at the federal level, Petry left the party when she left her
leadership position in 2017, and Franziska Schreiber, Petry’s former assistant,
published a memoir of her time in the AfD that has garnered extensive attention.57 In addition to these especially public exits, one more woman (Verena
Hartmann, as of January 2020) and three men (Lars Herrmann, December
2019; Uwe Kamann, December 2018; and Mario Mieruch, October 2017)
are now fraktionslos (without a party group) in the Bundestag, having left
the AfD. Petry and Hartmann’s exits represent 18.1 percent attrition (two
of eleven) among women; Herrmann, Kamann, and Mieruch’s exits represent 3.7 percent attrition (three of eighty-one) among men. These rates of
exit from a party that so rapidly gained entry into federal politics suggest
considerable instability. In some senses the AfD’s agenda is uncrystallized.
This incoherence is visible in officeholders’ departure from the party, and in
public disagreements between party leaders over whether and how explicitly
to violate long-held taboos. As time passes, the AfD is evolving, and relative newcomers (in fact or in origin story) may remain politically active by
turning to alternatives to the alternative. This study suggests that we will see
officeholders’ origin stories evolve, in turn.
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